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Introduction
Brett M. Frischmann, Michael J. Madison, and Katherine J. Strandburg*
The economics of the new commons is still in its infancy. It is too soon to be confident about its 
hypotheses. But it may yet prove a useful way of thinking about problems, such as managing the 
internet, intellectual property or international pollution, on which policymakers need all the 
help they can get.1
This book seeks to contribute to evidence-based policy making about innovation and 
creative production. Critics rightly complain that anecdote, ideology, wishful thinking, 
and brute political influence, more than empirical understanding, often drive intellec-
tual property policy making. We are concerned that recent enthusiasm about knowledge 
commons approaches (which we share) may be open to the same critique. Rather than 
embracing knowledge commons indiscriminately, policy making should be based on 
more evidence and deeper understanding of what makes them tick.
We embrace the analogy between the cultural environment and the natural environment 
(Boyle 2008; Frischmann 2007)  in order to explore the proposition that just as natural 
resources often are governed by commons, rather than being managed as either public or 
private property, the production and sharing of knowledge often is sustained by commons 
governance. Scholars of the natural environment have developed successful methods for 
* Brett M.  Frischmann is Professor of Law and Director of the Intellectual Property and Information Law 
Program at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, New York, New York, USA. Michael 
J. Madison is Professor of Law and Faculty Director of the Innovation Practice Institute at the University of 
Pittsburgh School of Law, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA. Katherine J. Strandburg is the Alfred B. Engelberg 
Professor of Law and a Faculty Director of the Engelberg Center for Innovation Law and Policy at the New York 
University School of Law, New York, New York, USA. Each is also a member of the Affiliated Faculty of the 
Vincent and Elinor Ostrom Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.
1 Commons Sense, The Economist ( July 31, 2008), at 76, http://www.economist.com/node/11848182.
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studying commons arrangements systematically and in detail. We borrow from them and 
propose a framework for studying knowledge commons that begins with the Institutional 
Analysis and Development (IAD) framework developed and used by Elinor Ostrom and 
others and adapts it to the unique attributes of knowledge and information.
This book describes the framework, in Chapter 1 and then includes case studies, reac-
tions, and comments from a group of interdisciplinary researchers. The purpose of this 
book is to begin the careful, detailed exploration of how knowledge commons function, 
the place they occupy in the cultural environment, the specific benefits they offer, the 
costs and risks they create, and their relationships to other institutional structures. Eleven 
case studies of knowledge commons are at the heart of book. The case study authors come 
from many different research traditions. The cases vary across a broad range of cultural 
and scientific domains and historical and contemporary practice. This volume brings 
these studies together as an initial demonstration of the value of studying knowledge 
commons carefully, in a comparative fashion, in order to develop evidence of the details 
of their purposes and operations. We hope that in time, empirical study of knowledge 
commons will show that, properly understood, they may be harnessed and even designed 
for broad public benefit Our concluding chapter highlights the framework’s success in 
bringing forward commonalities and differences between knowledge commons, while 
recognizing that producing generalizable understanding will require many more studies.
As law professors, we undertook this project initially out of interest in the functioning 
of systems of intellectual property rights—patent, copyright, and related bodies of law. 
Whether we look at the economics of the global knowledge economy or at the potential 
for collaboration and innovation unleashed by the computer and network revolutions 
of the last thirty years, the impulse to examine innovation institutions and behaviors is 
immediate. Wikipedia is a fascinating thing. The questions that it raises include not only 
“why do people contribute to Wikipedia?” but also “in cultural, economic, and legal 
terms, how does Wikipedia function today and how will it evolve in the future?” Linux is 
a widely used and commercially successful example of an open source computer program. 
Why have it and other open source programs succeeded, institutionally and organiza-
tionally? Why have some open source computer programs not thrived? Similarly broad 
questions can and should be directed to collaborative enterprises in science, technology, 
the arts, government, and beyond.
Traditionally, when intellectual property law scholarship examined institutions for 
promoting innovation and creativity, it divided the world into two, default perspec-
tives: innovation systems organized around markets, supported by intellectual prop-
erty rights directed to exclusivity and ownership, and innovation systems organized 
around governments, which intervene in markets (or avoid markets) in various ways 
to sponsor and subsidize innovation. A  third approach, commons-based sharing of 
knowledge and information resources to produce innovation and creativity, is increas-
ingly acknowledged and celebrated, as suggested by the article in The Economist maga-
zine quoted above. But writing about the commons approach is often conceptual or 
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political, using the idea of commons as a rhetorical device to oppose the expansion of 
intellectual property protection (Boyle 2008; Hyde 2010). Empirical study of norm- 
and custom-based innovation communities often is developed in opposition to (and 
therefore in reliance on) market-based presumptions of the need for exclusivity, sub-
stituting norm-based exclusivity for legal-defined intellectual property (Raustiala & 
Sprigman 2012).
One of our goals here is to stake out knowledge commons as an independent, affirma-
tive means for producing innovation and creativity and an important domain for research. 
In our view, commons are neither wholly independent of nor opposed to markets based 
on exclusive rights (whether formal or informal), nor are they subordinate to them.
As noted, our approach is inspired by the pathbreaking research of the late Elinor 
Ostrom, who was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 2009 for her life-
time of research into the functioning of commons governance, especially in the natural 
resources context. Ostrom was far from the first scholar to examine resource systems and 
governance using tools of comparative institutional analysis. But her work and that of her 
collaborators and successors highlighted commons as an object of study in a way that no 
scholar had done before. Ostrom also approached the topic with an extraordinary humil-
ity and disciplinary generosity, recognizing that understanding this complex area could 
only be achieved through the contributions of researchers from many fields, aligned via 
shared methods. Her impact was magnified by her emphasis on a shared research frame-
work accessible to and usable by numerous disciplines. We have tried to extend both the 
spirit and style of Ostrom’s work to our own.
Toward the end of Ostrom’s career, she and her colleagues recognized the emerging 
importance of knowledge commons as an area for sustained research and began to apply 
the IAD framework to them (Ostrom & Hess 2007; Hess 2012). In 2010 we developed 
a research framework specifically tailored to the properties that distinguish knowledge 
and information from natural resources (Madison, Frischmann, & Strandburg 2010). 
That framework, with some elaborations and clarifications, follows this introduction as 
Chapter 1 of this book.
The balance of the book is organized as follows.
Chapter 1 lays out our research framework in detail, including its origins in Ostrom’s 
work on commons, the background assumptions of scholarship on intellectual property 
rights and theories, and the template for organizing research inquiries in particular case 
studies. It explains in more detail what we mean by knowledge commons, why knowl-
edge commons deserve systematic study, and why we were motivated to write this book. 
Chapter 1 provides a thorough explanation of our proposed framework that we hope will 
encourage and enable others to use and improve upon it in their own studies of knowl-
edge commons.
Chapters 2 and 3 situate the study of knowledge commons within a broader context. 
In Chapter 2, Dan Cole relates the knowledge commons project to Elinor Ostrom’s work 
on natural resource commons, illustrating points of continuity and points of distinction. 
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Cole offers encouragement and caution to scholars seeking to use Ostrom’s work as a 
starting point for studying knowledge commons. He encourages those seeking “concep-
tual, analytical, and methodological guidance,” arguing that Ostrom’s work can provide a 
foundation for “improv[ing] understanding of information and information flows under 
alternative institutional arrangements,” “diagnos[ing] problems in existing institutional 
arrangements,” and even “predict[ing] outcomes under alternative institutional arrange-
ments.” He cautions, however, that those looking to Ostrom’s work for normative guid-
ance as to the proper structure of intellectual property law are “bound to be disappointed 
(or dishonest)” for two reasons:  First, Ostrom’s work teaches that there are “no pana-
ceas.” Second, researchers necessarily choose metrics for assessing commons outcomes. 
Whereas long-run sustainability is a widely accepted goal for natural resource commons, 
Cole suggests that outcome metrics for knowledge commons are likely to be much more 
contested.
In Chapter 3, Yochai Benkler provides a conceptual map for understanding the range 
of different types of commons that are important to society and deserve systematic study. 
He argues that there are important differences between the institutional arrangements 
studied by Ostrom and colleagues, in which a “defined set of claimants” share resources 
in a self-governing arrangement, and public domain or open access commons, which pro-
vide “freedom-to-operate under symmetric constraints, available to an open, or unde-
fined, class of users.” Benkler reminds us that knowledge commons arrangements are 
layered on top of and dependent upon substantial resource sets governed either as public 
domain commons or through private property arrangements.
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 apply the knowledge commons research framework to commons 
arrangements for scientific research, where tradition and custom teach that formal intellec-
tual property rights are particularly unlikely to play key roles in institutional governance, 
but where the knowledge commons research framework nonetheless reveals meaningful 
structure and governance of knowledge sharing. In Chapter 4, Jorge Contreras targets the 
genomics research collaborative that constituted the Human Genome Project. Geertrui 
Van Overwalle follows that chapter with a comment that notes the global context of 
research on genomic commons, illustrating that commons in general have important 
international and comparative dimensions. In Chapter  5, Katherine Strandburg, Brett 
Frischmann, and Can Cui delve into a network of medical researchers and patient advo-
cacy groups titled the Rare Diseases Clinical Research Network, and the related Urea 
Cycle Disorders Consortium. In Chapter 6, Michael Madison describes a citizen science 
project, called Galaxy Zoo, that pairs professional astronomers with amateurs.
Chapters 7 and 8 involve commons cases situated in the context of information and 
communications technologies (sometimes abbreviated ICTs). In Chapter  7, Charles 
Schweik presents the results of a comparative analysis of open source software develop-
ment communities. In Chapter 8, Mayo Fuster Morell reports a study of online creation 
communities (OCCs) such as the photosharing site, Flickr, used for sharing creative con-
tent supplied by individuals.
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Chapters  9, 10, and 11 involve commons cases that highlight the role of commons 
governance as it intersects with or overlaps with other governance institutions directed 
to knowledge production. In Chapter 9, Sonali Shah and Cyrus Mody describe entre-
preneurship, and particularly entrepreneurship by technology users, using the knowl-
edge commons perspective and borrowing examples from such diverse domains as 
windsurfing and probe microscopy. In Chapter 10, Peter Meyer reviews the history of 
the development of the fixed-wing airplane as an industrial invention, and its associated 
industries, as the product of open innovation communities that operated in the shadow 
of patent law. In Chapter  11, Laura Murray describes the history of newspapers with 
specific attention to historical norms that balanced proprietary control and sharing in 
journalism.
Chapters 12, 13, and 14 push the knowledge commons research framework in direc-
tions that illustrate its utility in contexts far from those the term immediately brings to 
mind. In Chapter 12, S. Tina Piper studies the history collaborative invention communi-
ties in the Canadian military. In Chapter 13, David Fagundes delves into the world of 
roller derby, an amateur sporting community that is governed almost entirely by informal 
norms. In Chapter 14, Brigham Daniels subjects the U.S. Congress to study as a case of 
commons governance in its production of legislation.
As the conclusion to this book points out in greater detail, the first and perhaps most 
important takeaway from this book is borrowed from a line sometimes attributed to 
Mark Twain. Asked if he believed in infant baptism, Twain allegedly replied, “Believe it? 
I’ve seen it done!” And so with the study of knowledge commons. An impressive collec-
tion of extremely thoughtful scholars has dissected a broad range of cases of commons 
in ways that usefully illuminate the workings of each case and, even more important, 
set the stage for continued comparative analysis of their results. The power and future 
of commons lies not just in the politics and rhetoric of commons but also in empirical 
understanding of when and how knowledge commons governance work—and when it 
doesn’t.
We conclude this introduction by pointing out that our collaboration in producing 
this work, and in collaborating with the other contributors, is itself best described as a 
knowledge commons. None of this research would be possible without extraordinary 
sharing of time, expertise, interest, and ideas. The future of this project depends on con-
tinuing that collaboration and expanding it. We hope that reading it inspires you to con-
sider giving our framework a try and encourage you to reach out to us with your ideas and 
insights for follow-on work.
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1 
I. Introduction
This chapter sets out the knowledge commons framework that forms the foundation for 
the case study chapters that follow (Madison, Frischmann, & Strandburg 2010a). The 
framework builds on the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) approach pio-
neered by Elinor Ostrom and her collaborators for studying commons arrangements in 
the natural environment (Ostrom 1990). By “knowledge commons” we refer broadly to 
commons arrangements for overcoming various social dilemmas associated with sharing 
and producing information, innovation, and creative works (Ostrom & Hess 2006).1 This 
1 Governing Knowledge CommonsBrett M. Frischmann, Michael J. Madison, and  
Katherine J. Strandburg*
* Brett M.  Frischmann is Professor of Law and Director of the Intellectual Property and Information Law 
Program at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, New York, New York, USA. Michael 
J. Madison is Professor of Law and Faculty Director of the Innovation Practice Institute at the University of 
Pittsburgh School of Law, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA. Katherine J. Strandburg is the Alfred B. Engelberg 
Professor of Law and a Faculty Director of the Engelberg Center for Innovation Law and Policy at the New York 
University School of Law, New York, New York, USA. Each is also a member of the Affiliated Faculty of the 
Vincent and Elinor Ostrom Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.
1 In the paper on which this chapter is based (Madison, Frischmann, & Strandburg 2010a), we referred to these 
as cultural commons, which we treat as equivalent to knowledge commons, and as constructed cultural commons. 
Cultural commons has been used recently by some other commons scholars (Enrico Bertacchini et al. 2012; Hess 
2012). Our approach is inclusive of theirs but perhaps broader. The term “constructed” refers to the idea, which 
we address in more detail below, that the resources in knowledge commons are built by human agency, rather 
than found somehow in nature.
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book includes case studies of a number of knowledge commons arrangements involving 
the creation and sharing of a diverse array of knowledge resources, such as scientific data, 
open source software, news resources for journalism, technological innovations, online 
knowledge resources such as Wikipedia, congressional legislation, and information used 
by roller derby participants. Some further examples of the types of arrangements we have 
in mind are patent pools (such as the Manufacturers Aircraft Association), the Associated 
Press, certain jamband communities, medieval guilds, and modern research universities. 
These examples are illustrative and far from exhaustive.
The systematic approach to case study design and analysis provided by the knowledge 
commons framework is intended not only to structure individual case studies in a use-
ful and productive way but also to make it possible eventually to produce generalizable 
results. By comparing and aggregating case studies performed according to the knowl-
edge commons framework, it should be possible to inventory the structural similarities 
and differences between commons in different industries, disciplines, and knowledge 
domains and to shed light on the underlying contextual reasons for the differences. This 
structured inquiry will provide a basis for developing theories to explain the emergence, 
form, and stability of the observed variety of knowledge commons and, eventually, for 
designing models to explicate and inform institutional design. In addition, an improved 
understanding of knowledge commons is critical for obtaining a more complete perspec-
tive on intellectual property (IP) doctrine and its interactions with other legal and social 
mechanisms for governing creativity and innovation.
What Do We Mean by Knowledge Commons?
“Knowledge commons” is shorthand. It refers to an approach (commons) to governing 
the management or production of a particular type of resource (knowledge).
Commons refers to a form of community management or governance. It applies 
to resources, and involves a group or community of people, but commons does not 
denote the resources, the community, a place, or a thing. Commons is the institu-
tional arrangement of these elements. “The basic characteristic that distinguishes com-
mons from noncommons is institutionalized sharing of resources among members of a 
community” (Madison, Frischmann, & Strandburg 2010b: 841). Critically, commons 
governance is used by a wide variety of communities to manage many different types 
of resources. Commons governance confronts various obstacles to sustainable sharing 
and cooperation. Some of those obstacles derive from the nature of the resources and 
others derive from other factors, such as the nature of the community or external influ-
ences. Communities can and often do overcome obstacles through constructed as well 
as emergent commons.
Knowledge refers to a broad set of intellectual and cultural resources. In prior work, 
we used the term “cultural environment” to invoke the various cultural, intellectual, 
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Some initial illustrations of knowledge commons suggest the variety of institutional 
arrangements we believe may be usefully studied using the framework described here.
Intellectual property pools. A patent pool is an agreement by two or more patent hold-
ers to aggregate and share their patents by cross-licensing (Shapiro 2000). The patents 
in question typically relate to complementary technologies, where one holder’s exercise 
of patent rights “blocks” a different holder’s exercise of related rights. Pooled patents are 
typically available to all members of the pool and are available to nonmembers on stan-
dard licensing terms. A well-known example of an early patent pool in the United States is 
the Manufacturers Aircraft Association (MAA), which formed in 1917 and encompassed 
nearly all American aircraft manufacturers. The Wright Company and Curtiss Company 
held major patents on aircraft technology, but Wright and Curtiss did not hold all relevant 
patents, and for any given manufacturer, the cost of licensing a single needed patent from 
a competitor might have made manufacturing an airplane prohibitively expensive. During 
World War I, the U.S. government needed airplanes at reasonable costs and in a short 
time. As a result, the government facilitated the implementation of the MAA, a private 
corporation. The MAA entered into an agreement with airplane manufacturers, through 
which the manufacturers pooled their patents and their potential claims for exploitation 
of the patents by rivals and agreed to cross-licensing of the patents to one another on 
what was, essentially, a royalty-free basis (Dykman 1964; Merges 1996: 1343–46). Largely 
because of this functioning commons of patented inventions, airplanes were built.
Open source software. The Linux operating system, an alternative to Windows and Mac 
OS (the Macintosh operating system), was produced and is still maintained by a collab-
orative of individual programmers, many of whom are volunteers (some are employed in 
firms, some of which produce and/or support commercial versions of the Linux software). 
The Linux collaborative is linked loosely by communications technologies, by members’ 
voluntary allegiance to the project, and by the terms of an open source license. Unlike 
proprietary computer programs, which are distributed to users in object code or execut-
able format only, open source programs such as Linux are made available in source code 
form so that members of the community may modify their copies and, under the terms 
of the governing license, publish their modifications for use by others. Members of the 
scientific, and social resources (and resource systems) that we inherit, use, experience, 
interact with, change, and pass on to future generations. We used this terminology to 
convey the broad range of resources we had in mind but have since realized that some 
readers found it confusing. Here we use the term “knowledge.” We emphasize that we 
cast a wide net and that we group information, science, knowledge, creative works, 
data, and so on together.
Knowledge commons is thus shorthand for the institutionalized community gov-
ernance of the sharing and, in some cases, creation, of information, science, knowl-
edge, data, and other types of intellectual and cultural resources.
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community may also volunteer their modifications for inclusion in the standard Linux 
code base. Each member of the Linux community may use material in the Linux com-
mons and may contribute material back to the Linux commons. Each individual member 
of the community contributes code to the accumulated archive of the Linux kernel, which 
is the core of the operating system. The rules governing the use of open source material 
and contributions to the open source commons are partly formal and partly informal. 
Formally, the software is governed by copyright law, and its use is managed by the terms of 
the General Public License. Informally, the integrity of Linux as an identifiable and stable 
program depends on a thin hierarchy of informal authority, which extends from Linus 
Torvalds at the top to the body of individual developers at the bottom. The result is an 
exemplary version of a successful open source software program: a complete, complex, and 
successful industrial product that is built and maintained not by a traditional, hierarchi-
cal, industrial firm, but by a loose-knit community (Kelty 2008; Schweik & English 2012).
Wikipedia. This free, online encyclopedia is widely read and cited. It resembles an open 
source software project in many respects. Volunteer authors create and edit Wikipedia 
entries; anyone with Internet access can read and use the contents of Wikipedia. 
Wikipedia is not the product of unregulated, potentially chaotic, openness. A  gover-
nance structure exists among “Wikipedians” that modulates the openness of the project 
and operates as a kind of law (Hoffman & Mehra 2009). For example, not all addi-
tions and edits to Wikipedia are automatically added to the site. Moreover, a Creative 
Commons Attribution-ShareAlike license, the copyright license that governs the con-
tents of Wikipedia, restricts the use of the contents of the site.2 Wikipedia also has a 
dispute-resolution system that plays an important role in sustaining the commons. The 
site is open, but with limits.
The Associated Press. For more than a century, the Associated Press (AP) has been the 
leading American wire service for newspapers (Reporters of the Associated Press 2007). 
It offers a compelling example of a knowledge commons that is not grounded in formal 
IP rights. As factual material, the news itself cannot be copyrighted (though there is an 
important but narrow “hot news misappropriation” tort rule (Gordon 2009: 2421–23)). 
Local newspapers could not afford to cover all of the stories that their readers wanted to 
read, yet the ease with which news stories can be appropriated served as a disincentive to 
invest in reporting—a classic free-rider dilemma. The solution was a not-for-profit coop-
erative, owned by the participant news organizations, which partnered originally with 
Western Union (Shmanske 1986). Cooperative members could both upload material that 
they originated locally to the wire service and download material that other members 
produced from the wire service. Local papers were able to carry AP reports on national 
and international news that they otherwise could not have afforded to produce. Without 
discounting allegations that the AP’s content was biased politically and that it behaved 
2 See Wikipedia: Licensing update, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Licensing_update. 
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monopolistically, considerations that highlight the need to view commons with a critical 
eye, the AP itself operated as a structured commons managed by its members.
Jamband fan communities. Musical groups known as jambands “jam,” or improvise 
heavily, during live performances. Beginning with fans of the best-known jamband, 
the Grateful Dead, jamband fan communities have long been encouraged by the artists 
themselves to produce and share their own concert recordings. These recordings initially 
were shared via physical media and now are shared using online archives (organized via 
the website and organization etree.org). The bands encourage this sharing, provided that 
the fans comply with informal rules that are set by the bands and honored and policed 
by the fan communities themselves (Schultz 2006). For example, as Schultz describes in 
his detailed case study of the jamband phenomenon, fan communities generally under-
take not to interfere with commercial exploitation of the bands’ own concert record-
ings (Schultz 2006, 675–76). Commons governance of jamband recordings is structured 
not merely by fan expectations that norms will be honored but also by file sharing and 
archiving technologies that reinforce the commercial/noncommercial distinction, by 
intermediary institutions that host jamband archives, and by the bands, which cooperate 
with and nurture their fan communities (Schultz 2006: 679–80).
At first glance, these examples may appear to be disparate and unrelated. Yet 
we believe that a systematic, comprehensive, and theoretically informed research 
framework offers significant potential to produce generalizable insights into these 
commons phenomena. Comparative institutional investigation of knowledge com-
mons is relevant to our understanding of social ordering and institutional gover-
nance generally. It should also produce insights important to intellectual property 
law. The conventional view of intellectual property is that resource production 
and consumption are (and ought to be) characterized primarily by entitlements to 
individual resource units, held individually and allocated via market mechanisms 
(Merges 1996:  4–7). To the extent that those market mechanisms are inadequate 
to optimize the welfare of society, or, in other words, in the event of market failure, 
government intervention may be appropriate. Intellectual property rights tradition-
ally are justified on precisely this basis (Lemley 2005:  1073). Creative works and 
new inventions are characterized as public goods, whose intangibility prevents their 
originators from excluding potential users and thus recouping their investments via 
sales (Lemley 2005: 1050–55). Copyright and patent laws create artificial but legally 
sanctioned forms of exclusion, restoring a measure of market control to creators 
and innovators. Where propertization is insufficient, government subsidy is seen as 
the primary alternative. Communal and collectivist institutions, particularly those 
that blend informal normative structures with formal governance rules, are gener-
ally regarded as exceptional and dependent upon preexisting property entitlements 
(Rose 2008: 432–28).
The research framework that we describe below offers a method for assessing the valid-
ity of this property-focused narrative. We anticipate that study of a large number of cases 
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using the framework, ranging broadly across different knowledge and cultural contexts, 
is likely to demonstrate that successful knowledge production and management occurs 
within a wide variety of formal and informal institutional arrangements. We suspect that 
the logical and normative priority assigned to proprietary rights and government inter-
vention will turn out to be misplaced.
II. The Backdrop: Intellectual Property, Free Riding, Commons, and the Need 
for Empirical Study of Knowledge Commons
This part begins with a brief discussion of the free-rider allegory that provides the tradi-
tional foundation for intellectual property law and theory. It describes the limitations of 
the free-rider paradigm and of intellectual property as a panacean approach to knowledge 
production. It then notes the rise of community production as an alternative model for 
knowledge production and expresses concern that, in some circles, community produc-
tion may be emerging as an alternative panacean approach. It argues that policy and the-
ory aimed at resolving the complex issue of how best to produce and manage intellectual 
resources should be grounded in a more detailed and nuanced empirical understanding.
A. Functionalist Intellectual Property Theory and Its Limits
Intellectual property law scholarship typically has viewed invention, creative expression, 
innovation, and related or subsidiary activities (such as research and development) as 
a special set of practices for which extra encouragement is warranted. Despite consid-
erable variation and nuance, these activities all can be understood to present the same 
core problem. The “outputs” from these activities—whether described as information, 
expression, invention, innovation, research, ideas, or otherwise—are public goods. They 
are naturally nonrivalrous or nondepletable, meaning that consumption of the good does 
not deplete the amount available to other users, and nonexcludable, meaning that knowl-
edge outputs are not naturally defined by boundaries that permit cheap exclusion of 
users (Frischmann 2012: 24–30, 261–68; Frischmann & Lemley 2007: 272–273; Cornes 
& Sandler 1996: 40–43). As a result, the production of such resources faces a well-known 
supply-side problem, common to public goods. The inability to (cheaply) exclude com-
petitors and nonpaying consumers (often called “free riders”) presents a risk to investors. 
This risk is perceivable ex ante (prior to production of the good) and thus may lead to 
undersupply. Essentially, in the absence of some institutional solution, there would be a 
significant underinvestment in (some types of ) intellectual resources because of the risk 
that competitors would appropriate their value (Frischmann 2009a: 2156).
The extent of the free-rider problem in a given instance will depend on the costs of 
exclusion and boundary setting. But even if low-cost exclusion of free riders is feasible, 
the nonrivalry of intellectual resources means that markets still will tend to undersupply 
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them. While exclusion enhances incentives to create some intellectual resources, it simul-
taneously limits their availability (Frischmann 2012:  261–68). An additional layer of 
complexity emerges when we look beyond intellectual resources as isolated “goods” and 
consider their importance as inputs, outputs, and continuous constituents of complex 
intellectual, cultural, economic, and social processes and systems (Frischmann 2012: 268–
75; Benkler 2006: 37). The conventional approach to intellectual property collapses this 
complexity into a linear conception of trade-offs or balancing between “upstream” and 
“downstream” creators.
At its core, the free-rider allegory illustrates the social dilemma associated with a stan-
dard externality problem—each individual free rider rationally maximizes his or her 
private welfare without accounting for external costs. In this context, the social costs 
encompass the risk to investment and resulting underproduction of public goods over 
time. The model easily can be mapped onto the classic collective action problem, in 
which unconstrained consumption appears unsustainable, producing the so-called “trag-
edy of the commons.”
In remarkable parallelism with the history of the tragedy of the commons allegory and 
its role in environmental circles, many analysts of knowledge production issues simply 
assume the free-rider allegory describes a normal rather than exceptional problem. Also, 
in remarkable parallelism, a binary solution set, comparable to the standard set of solu-
tions in physical resource production settings, seems to follow naturally: To avoid trag-
edy, society must turn to production subsidized by government or to markets enabled by 
property rights, specifically intellectual property rights. Both approaches rely on collec-
tive action through government, but they differ substantially in terms of the manner in 
which resource allocation decisions are made (Frischmann 2013). Government subsidiza-
tion deals with the underproduction problem head on. Government allocates funds to 
selected research activities that yield intellectual resources, which can, in principle, be 
shared openly and freely within the “public domain.”3 Intellectual property rights, such 
as patents and copyrights, address the underproduction problem by enabling markets to 
function more effectively in supplying intellectual resources. Intellectual property rights 
lower the costs of exclusion, enable transactions, and mitigate the risks to investment 
posed by free riders. Yet, for a variety of reasons that are beyond the scope of this intro-
duction, both solutions are incomplete and entail a host of significant problems.
The free-rider allegory heavily influences the framing and perception of the insti-
tutional arrangement of the cultural environment, by dividing it into two conceptual 
domains. First, there is the domain of intellectual property, in which producers of cre-
ative and innovative things employ proprietary rights sanctioned by law to control devel-
opment, distribution, and exploitation of intellectual resources. IP law constructs and 
assigns these exclusive rights and encourages their exploitation through market exchange. 
3 For various reasons that are beyond the scope of this discussion, government-subsidized knowledge resources 
are not always contributed to the public domain.
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Private rights and private market exchange serve to limit, by law, the natural shareability 
of knowledge and innovation. The intellectual property perspective assumes that pro-
ducers would abandon their efforts to produce, develop, and/or disseminate knowledge 
goods for fear of free riding by competitors or consumers.
Second, there is the public domain, a vast collection of openly accessible knowledge 
resources. The purpose of maintaining a public domain is to permit any and all comers 
to appropriate its resources freely and to use them to create or innovate anew. For some 
resources, the benefits of overcoming the free-rider problem are outweighed by the 
social value of permitting the resources to serve as the foundation for new creations and 
innovations or otherwise to be used in ways that are socially beneficial, such as when fair 
uses of copyrighted expression support public capabilities associated with education or 
political participation. Some resources enter the public domain as the result of direct 
or indirect provisioning by government using a combination of grants to researchers; 
tax credits or subsidies to researchers and enterprises that employ them; prizes; and 
production and distribution of knowledge and innovation by the government itself, 
either by organizing research enterprises or by purchasing and distributing private 
research. Other resources occupy the public domain because of limitations to existing 
intellectual property systems (for example, due to express exclusion from the system 
as uncopyrightable ideas4 or unpatentable laws or products of nature,5 or to expiration 
of rights.6) These limitations attempt to balance free-rider concerns against the social 
costs of awarding exclusive rights to nonrivalrous resources. Sometimes resources effec-
tively belong to the public domain despite being legally subject to intellectual property 
rights because those rights are not enforced (for example, because potential owners 
dedicate their resources to the public or because exclusion is practically impossible).
This conventional two-part framing is woefully inadequate as a descriptive mat-
ter. The traditional free-rider allegory provides little insight into determining how 
and whether particular intellectual resources should be, or are, supplied to the public 
domain. Essentially, both the allegory and the institutional framing to which it relates 
are caricatures—oversimplified accounts that roughly describe some cultural practices 
and productive activities but leave much too much out of frame, unexamined, and unac-
counted for. Frischmann (2013) recently suggested that
we should ask two foundational sets of questions:  First, how well does the free 
rider allegory describe reality? Is it a useful theory for making predictions about 
4 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 107 (2012) (providing for limits on the scope of copyrightable subject matter and for 
the fair use defense).
5 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103 (2012) (providing for limits on the scope of patentable subject matter); 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (noting that the laws of nature, physical phenomena, and 
abstract ideas are not patentable).
6 See U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“limited times”); 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012) (establishing the duration of a copy-
right); 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012) (establishing the duration of a patent).
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real-world behavior of individuals? Does it describe a normal or exceptional situa-
tion? Does it provide a useful basis for choosing or designing regulatory solutions? 
Second, does the binary choice between government subsidization and intellectual 
property-enabled markets reflect the full range of options? Are there alternative 
institutions and/or means for collective action?
In many circumstances, the free-rider allegory does not provide an adequate description 
of reality. Moreover, even where there are free-rider concerns, the binary choice between 
IP and government subsidy completely misses the possibility for alternative institutional 
solutions.
First, reality is considerably more complex than the free-rider allegory suggests. There 
are many situations in which free riding does not undermine incentives to produce 
knowledge resources. Whether that is the case depends on contextual factors such as the 
type of investment required and the type of intellectual resources created. Many intel-
lectual resources plainly are not subject to this concern; people produce them regularly 
without regard for misappropriation (Frischmann 2012). Often, people innovate because 
their expected private benefits exceed their fixed costs, regardless of whether or not oth-
ers free ride. Benefits conferred on “free riders” may be irrelevant to these kinds of incen-
tives or even may add to them (Amabile 1996; Baron & Shane 2007; Frey 2008; Lakhani 
& Wolf 2005; Tirole & Lerner 2002; Stock et al. 2013; von Hippel 2005).
Participation can be fun, intellectually stimulating, educational or service-oriented, 
among other things (Benkler 2006; Quiggin & Hunter 2008; Loren 2008; Tushnet 
2009; Zimmerman 2011; Schweik & English 2012). Participation may not be effort-
less or free; it may require substantial investment. Regardless, the private value derived 
from participation may be sufficient, and external benefits conferred to others that use 
or consume the output (i.e., the intellectual resource) may be irrelevant to incentives 
to invest. Similarly, in many situations, people create, invent, and innovate because 
the anticipated returns from their own uses of the results are sufficient to justify the 
investment. A  rich literature on user innovation demonstrates how many significant 
innovations result from users seeking to solve their own particular problems, needs, or 
curiosities (von Hippel 2005; Strandburg 2009: 871–88). People often engage in such 
activities without disabling concern over free riding and without reliance on govern-
ment subsidies.
The point should be clear. Free riding does not necessarily reduce incentives to invest 
and does not inevitably lead to a social dilemma. Reality is considerably more complex 
than the free-rider allegory suggests, and there is no good reason for systematically mar-
ginalizing the many situations in which free riding does not reduce incentives to invest. 
Such myopia is inexcusable. Indeed, a myopic focus on the free-rider issue may distract 
researchers and policy makers from other social dilemmas that may be more important 
in some contexts. For example, some intellectual resources may be exploited in secrecy, 
as is recognized by trade secrecy laws and by patent law’s disclosure requirements. Such 
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resources do not suffer from free-rider problems, but from a different set of social dilem-
mas related to the social costs of secrecy. Another example arises in the user innovation 
context. Intrinsic or user motivations for innovation sufficient to overcome free-rider 
concerns, may not incentivize investments in codifying and disclosing those innovations 
for the benefit of society and in disseminating embodiments of those innovations for 
others’ use (Strandburg 2010). While user innovators often disclose their innovations to 
other users because they can benefit when other users critique or improve upon them 
(Franke & Shah 2003; Harhoff et al. 2003), recent studies show that many user innovators 
do not invest in disclosure and dissemination, again posing social dilemmas unrelated to 
the dominant free-rider allegory (Gault & von Hippel 2009; von Hippel & Demonaco 
2013). We discuss various examples of other social dilemmas throughout this book.
Second, as is our focus here, the traditional binary of IP rights and government sub-
sidy misses out on a wide variety of alternative institutions for solving social dilem-
mas involved in the production and management of knowledge resources, including 
free-rider problems (Merges 1996; Reichman & Uhlir 2003; Raustiala & Sprigman 
2012). Unfortunately, comparative institutional analysis is limited in this area (Rai 1999; 
Frischmann 2000; Newell et  al. 2008; Sarnoff 2013), as is more systematic analysis of 
interdependencies among various institutions.
We must emphasize how much contemporary analysis of the law and public policy of 
knowledge production rests on the traditional account of the basic public goods problem 
and binary set of solutions. That account shapes—if not determines—the set of baseline 
premises that undergird the legal and social institutions that structure the cultural envi-
ronment and shape normative outcomes. Although our undertaking is emphatically posi-
tive and descriptive, we strongly believe that significant normative implications should 
eventually flow from a better understanding of knowledge commons. The bottom line 
is that the free-rider allegory and associated binary solution set rarely describe shared 
resource settings in a sufficiently complete manner to qualify as a useful theory for mak-
ing predictions or prescribing solutions. Much more is needed.
B. The Need for Systematic Empirical Study of Knowledge 
Commons
Much of the debate in IP law has pitted proponents of privatization as a means of incen-
tivizing production of intellectual goods against proponents of a widely available pub-
lic domain upon which cultural goods can be built. That discussion has often devolved 
into a disagreement over the relative importance of upstream incentives and downstream 
access for generating ideas and creative expression. As technology facilitates an increas-
ingly extensive, varied landscape of social and cooperative projects that enable creativity 
and innovation, a third perspective has emerged. Books, articles, and scholarly discussion 
of such projects increasingly extol community production as a solution to the free-rider 
problems of cultural production (Benkler 2006).
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Recognizing the importance of community production, but concerned that the 
amorphous idea of “openness” might become the new one-size-fits-all panacean 
approach in rivalry with privatization and public subsidy, scholars have pointed out 
that many of the most interesting and important aspects of the information environ-
ment exist in the area between these extremes. The information environment is rid-
dled with complex combinations of private intellectual property rights, contracts, and 
social norms that are partly open and partly closed, usable by members and sometimes 
by the public at large, though not always on a purely “free” basis. Examples of these 
knowledge commons—sometimes called “semicommons” (Smith 2000)—include 
such diverse institutions as public lending libraries, research universities, trade and 
craft organizations, and repositories of biological information. Default rules of intel-
lectual property may be combined with licenses and contracts, with social norms and 
with cultural and other institutional forms to construct these knowledge commons, 
which depend on—but are built alongside and on top of—basic forms of knowledge 
and culture. Knowledge commons arrangements often are characterized by what 
Frischmann and Lemley term “spillovers”:  social benefits that flow from uses and 
reuses of information resources and sustain the dynamic character of the informa-
tion environment (Frischmann & Lemley 2007: 268–71). Legal limitations on intel-
lectual property rights support the possibility of constructing commons governance 
arrangements that allow resources to be used in ways that generate spillovers (Madison 
2005a: 409).
Our knowledge commons framework emerges from our belief that the production 
and management of knowledge and information resources is an inherently social phe-
nomenon, taking place over a wide range of scales and within a complex, overlapping 
variety of formal and informal institutional structures (Madison 2005b). Certainly, 
social production of cultural goods has become more salient and more economically 
important as a result of globalization and of the communications revolution symbol-
ized by the Internet. Scholars are beginning to grapple with the realization that legal 
facilitation of innovation and creative production is not and cannot be confined to a 
simple set of property rules to incentivize individual innovative and creative efforts. 
Sustaining innovation and creativity is a matter of governance, using legal and other 
tools. The question for public policy, law, and legal theory becomes how best to 
use those tools to encourage the growth and persistence of creative, sustainable, and 
equitable cultural environments.
If commons are truly common, then they should be given a central place as research 
subjects, rather than either marginalized by conventional, overly simple private rights/
public domain dualism or uncritically extolled. The increasing salience of the commu-
nity production alternative should motivate us to explore the details of the landscape of 
knowledge and information production systematically from an institutional standpoint 
and to identify where, when, and how knowledge governance regimes work to society’s 
benefit.
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III. The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework
A. Motivation for a Framework Approach in the Natural Resource 
Context
A group of scholars of commons regimes in the natural environment, spearheaded 
by the late Elinor Ostrom and her collaborators, have for decades been studying 
commons in the natural resource environment (Ostrom 2007). Examples of natu-
ral resources systems governed as commons include lobster fisheries, grazing pas-
tures, forests, and irrigation systems (Ostrom 1990: 58–88; Acheson 2003). For each 
of these resources, previous scholars had diagnosed a similar underlying problem, 
often called, following Hardin (1968), a “tragedy of the commons” (Rose 2008: 411). 
Given a pool of rivalrous resources that is presumptively open to all comers, such as 
a meadow for grazing sheep, and absent a mechanism for coordinating the actions of 
resource users (the owners of the sheep), the resources are likely to be overconsumed 
and under-replenished. If resource users act rationally and independently in pursuit 
of their own self-interest, without regard for the costs imposed on other users, the 
pool eventually will be destroyed. This “tragedy of the commons” illustrates a stan-
dard externality problem that manifests a failure of collective action. The “tragedy of 
the commons” story often is coupled with an assumption that tragedy can be avoided 
only by one of a binary set of choices: exclusionary property rights allocated via mar-
kets (Demsetz 1967:  348)  and government intervention and regulation (Cornes & 
Sandler 1996: 72–78). The work of commons scholars in the natural resource arena 
demonstrated the fallacy in this binary perspective by grounding theory in in-depth 
empirical study of the ways in which people actually organize and govern their use of 
common-pool resources.
Ostrom’s approach to governance of natural resources broke with convention by rec-
ognizing the importance of institutions intermediate between private property and the 
state in solving problems of collective action. These intermediate institutions, sometimes 
called “limited commons” or “semicommons,” are collective, locally organized, means 
for governing and making productive and sustainable use of shareable, but depletable, 
resources such as fish, water, and trees (Ostrom 1990:  88–90). The empirical research 
of Ostrom and other scholars demonstrates that solutions to these resource-sharing 
problems are various and highly contextual, and may be formal or informal. Such 
common-pool resources, or resource systems, often exist in complex institutional set-
tings in which smaller commons are “nested” within larger ones, so that researchers must 
explore these institutions at different scales or levels of detail (Ostrom 2005:  58–62). 
Standard theoretic models, whether or not grounded in the presumption that a tragedy 
of the commons is present, can therefore be only the beginning of a much more com-
plex analysis. The temptation to seek out regulatory panaceas based on universal mod-
els, whether through private property, state action, or even notions of community, must 
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be resisted in favor of a more nuanced approach (Ostrom 2007). That approach begins 
with a research framework, guided by multiple theoretical possibilities and openness to 
considering the different variables that might affect outcomes. Only later, in light of the 
aggregation and analysis of data, does it become possible and meaningful to generalize 
and eventually to construct testable models.
As Ostrom explains, frameworks, theories, and models have different roles to play:
The development and use of a general framework helps to identify the elements 
(and the relationships among these elements) that one needs to consider for insti-
tutional analysis. Frameworks . . . provide the most general set of variables that 
should be used to analyze all types of settings relevant for the framework. . . . They 
attempt to identify the universal elements that any relevant theory would need to 
include. . . .
The development and use of theories enable the analyst to specify which compo-
nents of a framework are relevant for certain kinds of questions and to make broad 
working assumptions about these elements. Thus, theories focus on parts of a frame-
work and make specific assumptions that are necessary for an analyst to diagnose a 
phenomenon, explain its processes, and predict outcomes. . . . Microeconomic the-
ory, game theory, transaction cost theory, social choice theory, public choice, con-
stitutional and covenantal theory, and theories of public goods and common-pool 
resources are all compatible with the IAD framework. . . . 
One needs a common framework and family of theories in order to address ques-
tions of reforms and transitions. Particular models then help the analyst to deduce 
specific predictions about likely outcomes of highly simplified structures. Models 
are useful in policy analysis when they are well-tailored to the particular problem 
at hand. Models are used inappropriately when applied to the study of problem-
atic situations that do not closely fit the assumptions of the model. . . . (Ostrom 
2005: 28–29)
B. The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework
The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework was developed and used 
to structure a common set of research questions to apply across these diverse contexts. It 
has been successful in coming to some conclusions about the significance and interac-
tions of various factors in facilitating effective management of natural resources (Ostrom 
2007:  15181–82). Based on the information obtained by applying their framework to 
structured case studies, these researchers developed theories and models for particu-
lar commons situations, designed experiments to test those theories, and used statisti-
cal methods to look for regularities across cases. Based on this empirical work, Ostrom 
advanced a set of design principles for successful natural resource commons.
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The IAD framework for natural resource commons is illustrated in Figure 1.1
On the left are represented a group of variables that are “exogenous” with respect to 
a particular set of interactions taking place in an “action arena” (Ostrom 2005: 13). The 
IAD framework identifies the important variables for analyzing the way that community 
members interact in a particular situation as biophysical characteristics, attributes of the 
community, and “rules-in-use.” In the case of the lobster fishery, for example, these attri-
butes might include the relevant biological characteristics of lobsters, such as the rates 
at which they age and reproduce; attributes of the community of fishermen, such as the 
proximity in which they live to others, the existence of familial relationships, and the skill 
sets needed for lobster fishing; and the rules—which are the net result of whatever infor-
mal and formal rules nominally apply to a particular situation—that actually govern the 
way that fishermen (and any other relevant actors) interact with one another and with 
the resource in various situations that arise (Ostrom 2007: 15184–85). The central por-
tion of the figure identifies the variables that define the “action arena.” An action arena 
“refers to the social space where participants with diverse preferences interact, exchange 
goods and services, solve problems, dominate one another, or fight (among the many 
things that individuals do in action arenas)” (Ostrom 2005:  14)—in other words, the 
place at which the exogenous variables combine in particular instances, leading over time 
to observed patterns of interactions and outcomes. A  particular action arena involves 
specific action situations and specific actors, along with those actors’ identities and roles. 
At the far right of the figure are the patterns of interactions, outcomes, and evaluative 
criteria that determine how the variables that are exogenous in a particular interaction 
may eventually respond and change.
The “tragedy of the commons” allegory makes assumptions about the biophysical 
characteristics (depletable), community (independent, self-interested rational actors), 
and “rules-in-use” (every fisherman for himself ) that apply in the action arena of fishing 
for lobsters. It also assumes that independent fishermen are the only actors in the action 
arena and that the collective action problem posed by the “tragedy of the commons” is 














figure 1.1 The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework.
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outcome that ensues is scarcity, depletion, and, eventually collapse. Viewing the “tragedy 
of the commons” story through the lens of the IAD framework illuminates its empiri-
cal shortcomings. Lobsters are not purely depletable. They can, as a biological matter, 
reproduce and replenish the resource. The community does not consist of entirely inde-
pendent actors. Fishermen and their communities have more complicated relationships, 
which permit them to cooperate, at least in some respects. The “rules-in-use” in the lob-
ster fishery are more complex than “every fisherman for himself.” As a result, the interac-
tions in the lobster fishing action arena can produce very different outcomes than the 
tragedy of the commons story would predict. A successful commons governance regime 
may, however, require the community to resolve a nested set of social dilemmas over and 
above the basic collective action problem.
As a methodological matter, structuring a case study according to the IAD frame-
work, involves asking specific questions about each of the sets of variables identified in 
Figure 1.1, which assist the researcher in drilling down into the facts of a particular case 
(Ostrom 2005: 13–14). Questions about the biophysical characteristics, attributes of the 
community, and rules-in-use, for example, include the following:
• What boundaries define the shared resource pool? What is the source of supply 
and sustainability of the resource units? Under what conditions may resource 
units be appropriated from the pool?
• How does the population monitor and enforce rules regarding contribution 
and appropriation? What sorts of sanctions are available, and what sanctions are 
actually used? What conflict resolution mechanisms are in place?
• If the community relies on other populations in some respects, or if the popula-
tion delegates some functions to subsidiary populations, what is the character of 
these relationships?
• In all instances, to what extent are these attributes inscribed in formal institu-
tions of the state? To what extent are they inscribed in other formal, legal insti-
tutions, and to what extent are they inscribed in social norms or other social or 
cultural structures?
Employing the IAD framework to investigate a number of different real-world cases 
illuminated the diversity of possible combinations of exogenous variables that determine 
what actually happens in particular instances and, hence, the outcomes that result. The 
rules governing lobster fishing contribute to the activity’s long-term sustainability, for 
example, but the patterns of interaction actually observed depend on the richness of the 
particular environment for lobsters, the degree to which rules are actually enforced, sea-
sonal factors such as weather, and interaction with outside influences such as pollution 
and the state of the larger economy. Understanding the observed success or failure of a 
commons enterprise such as a lobster fishery may require accounting for all of these fac-
tors, even though it may turn out that outcomes are relatively impervious to some of them. 
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The IAD framework thus allows researchers to move beyond the overly general assump-
tions of the “tragedy of the commons” story to investigate how resources actually are gov-
erned, structuring the empirical inquiry so that comparisons between cases are possible, 
while avoiding unwarranted assumptions related to particular theories or models.
IV. Developing a Framework for the Study of Knowledge Commons
A. Learning from and Adapting the Institutional Analysis and 
Development Framework
The IAD framework has proven fruitful in the natural resources context (The Economist 
2008). We argue that the lessons learned by these scholars of natural resource commons 
caution against an overly simplistic view of community knowledge production and man-
agement. The devil is in the details. The nested, multi-tiered character of productive and 
sustainable knowledge and information systems and the diversity of attributes that con-
tribute to successful governance regimes are key to understanding knowledge commons 
as mechanisms for knowledge production, collection, curation, and distribution in the 
context of modern information and IP law regimes. We therefore propose that Ostrom’s 
approach to the systematized study of natural resource commons be adapted to study 
knowledge commons in the cultural environment. We use the “cultural environment” 
metaphor advisedly, following the work of Boyle (Boyle 1997: 108–12). The environmen-
tal metaphor for information law and policy—focusing on knowledge and information 
resources rather than physical or natural resources—offers an illuminating and useful 
starting point for this project.
Ostrom and her colleagues have taken preliminary steps toward understanding how 
the IAD framework might be used to investigate certain knowledge commons. Ostrom 
and Hess have analyzed the management of digital collections of existing knowledge 
resources, an admirable first step that signals the need for and plausibility of extending 
the IAD framework to the cultural environment (Ostrom & Hess 2007).
The environmental metaphor has its limitations, however. We argue that the IAD 
framework must be modified and extended to account adequately for the wide variety of 
knowledge commons. Unlike commons in the natural resource environment, knowledge 
commons arrangements usually must create a governance structure within which par-
ticipants not only share existing resources but also engage in producing those resources 
and, indeed, in determining their character. In fact, knowledge commons members often 
come together for the very purpose of creating particular kinds of knowledge resources. 
The relevant community is determined not by geographical proximity to an existing 
resource, but by some connection—perhaps of interest or of expertise—to the knowl-
edge resources to be created. These characteristics of knowledge commons suggest that 
neatly separating the attributes of the managed resources from the attributes and rules-in-
use of the community that produces and uses them is impossible.
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Just as the simple tragedy of the commons allegory is insufficient to specify the social 
dilemmas that must be overcome by a natural resource commons, the simple free-rider 
allegory is only one of the possible social dilemmas that are likely to confront a knowl-
edge commons. Indeed, the characteristics of knowledge commons just described suggest 
that a more complex set of social dilemmas is likely to arise in the knowledge context. 
Here we give several illustrations of this point.
First, like the natural resource commons that Ostrom studied, knowledge commons 
not only allocate resource consumption opportunities but also must cope with challenges 
in coordinating and combining resources. In knowledge and information contexts, solu-
tions to a range of coordination challenges are fundamental. Those who create, invent or 
innovate, and participate in similar intellectually driven, productive activities necessarily 
borrow from and share with others. It is impossible to divest oneself of that to which 
one has been exposed. Inevitably, the intellectual products of past and contemporary 
“producers” (creators, inventors, innovators, thinkers, and the like) serve as inputs into 
later productive activities. Producers necessarily borrow and share—and not in any fixed 
or small number of ways.
Second, the nonrivalrous and nonexcludable knowledge resources that make up the 
cultural environment are not naturally defined by boundaries that permit exclusion 
of users. Boundaries are built rather than found. They come from at least two sources. 
Intangible knowledge resources often are embodied in tangible product forms, which 
create boundaries. Additionally, law and other social practices may create boundaries 
around the intangible resources themselves, as, for example, in the case of the “claims” of 
a patent. The creation of boundaries is partly within and partly outside of the control of 
the members of a knowledge commons community and generates a series of social dilem-
mas to be resolved.
Third, knowledge and information resources must be created (or at least identified 
as knowledge and information resources) before they can be shared. Therefore, knowl-
edge commons must manage coordination, combination, and competition issues relat-
ing both to resource production and to resource use within and potentially beyond the 
commons participants. The public goods character of knowledge resources necessitates 
consideration not only of dynamics internal to a commons community but also of rela-
tionships between commons and other, related institutions. Knowledge commons must 
confront questions of openness that may generate additional social dilemmas (Madison, 
Frischmann, & Strandburg 2009: 368–69.)
Fourth, the nonrivalry of knowledge and information resources often rides on top of 
various rivalrous inputs (such as time or money) and may provide a foundation for vari-
ous rivalrous outputs (such as money or fame). Knowledge commons must confront the 
social dilemmas associated with obtaining and distributing these rivalrous resources.
Finally, understanding a knowledge commons may require researchers to engage with 
the particular narratives of the community, which may be grounded in storytelling, 
metaphor, history, and analogy. The property scholar Carol Rose emphasizes the role of 
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narratives, especially of origin stories, in explaining features of property regimes that are 
not determinable strictly on theoretical or functional grounds, particularly if one assumes 
that everyone begins from a position of rational self-interest (Rose 1994: 35–42). The sto-
ries that are told about knowledge commons, and by those who participate in them, are 
instructive with respect to understanding the construction, consumption, and coordina-
tion of knowledge resources. Particular histories, stories, and self-understandings may 
be important in constructing the social dilemmas that arise and in determining why a 
particular knowledge commons approaches them in a particular way.
Given the broad range of possible social dilemmas that may arise, a research framework 
can help researchers to develop, apply, and ultimately choose among an equally broad 
set of different relevant theories. Not only law but also economics, sociology, and his-
tory each may have much to offer in the future when interpreting case studies on knowl-
edge commons. There is no reason now to limit the disciplinary conversation to only one 
of those fields—or to preempt future conversations about knowledge commons from 
blending them. For example, club theory, which distinguishes sharply between commu-
nity members and outsiders, may be helpful in understanding the dynamics of patent 
pools but poorly suited to understanding Wikipedia, which is quite open in terms of 
membership, contributions, and participation in various aspects of the project. Patent 
pools manage shared resources in a fashion that is much less focused than Wikipedia on 
sustaining joint production. Consequently, club theory is not likely to be particularly 
helpful for a researcher studying Wikipedia. Other theories of cooperation might be bet-
ter suited to the task. A research framework such as ours aims to systematize the inves-
tigation, facilitate a more rigorous evaluation by matching and testing of theories and 
models with observed phenomena, and, most generally, enable learning over time. We do 
not, for example, advocate adopting a strict definition in the first place that answers the 
question “what is a commons?” (Madison, Frischmann, & Strandburg 2010b: 840–42). 
Nor do we adopt strict boundaries on the set of potentially relevant resources. The IAD 
framework in the natural resource domain was intended to be an inclusive method for 
conducting case-based research and collecting and comparing cases. By design, the IAD 
framework remains a work in progress, which is one of its strengths. We follow that tra-
dition in proposing a framework for knowledge commons research. We designed our 
IAD-based framework based on our intuitions regarding the challenges and opportuni-
ties posed by governance institutions that feature shared resources, but we expect that it 
will be developed and honed as it is used.
B. Specifying a Framework for Studying Knowledge Commons
We illustrate our proposed framework for knowledge commons with the flow chart in 
Figure 1.2, which reflects the iterative and constructed character of the commons com-
munity, its knowledge or information resources, and its governing “rules-in-use.” Figure 1.2 
is based on the IAD flow chart reproduced in Figure 1.1 (Ostrom 2005: 15), but it differs 
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in some key respects. Because of the more complex relationships among resources, par-
ticipants, and governance structures in knowledge commons, relevant attributes may not 
divide as neatly into categories as they do when one is describing a pool of natural resources. 
Thus, in the left-most part of the chart, we place new emphasis on the interactions among 
and constructed or manufactured nature of the knowledge and information resources 
themselves, as indicated by the arrows between them. We also illustrate the way in which 
interactions in the action arena, by creating intellectual resources, can feed directly back 
into the characteristics of the resources being managed by a knowledge commons.
Figure 1.2 also collapses a distinction made in the original IAD framework between 
“patterns of interactions” that follow from the action arena, and outcomes that follow 
from the patterns of interaction. We argue that the patterns of interactions generated 
by the formal and informal rules systems of a knowledge commons are often insepara-
ble from the outcomes it produces. How people interact with rules, resources, and each 
other, in other words, is itself an outcome that is inextricably linked with and determi-
native of the form and content of the knowledge or informational output of the com-
mons. In an open source software project, for example, the existence and operation of the 
open source development collaborative, the identity of the dynamic thing called the open 
source software program, and the existence and operation of the relevant open source 
software license and other governance mechanisms are constitutive of one another.7
With this general modified framework in mind, we now describe our proposed frame-
work for empirical study of particular constructed cultural commons. Building on the 
high-level categories reflected in Figure  1.2, we now elucidate the categories of ques-
tions that should guide any specific investigation in more detail. The box, “Knowledge 













figure 1.2 The Knowledge Commons Framework.
7 See Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (concluding that violations of an open source 
software license can be remedied by injunction, in order to preserve the productive character of the open source 
community).
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Knowledge Commons Framework and Representative Research 
Questions
Background Environment
• What is the background context (legal, cultural, etc.) of this particular commons?
• What is the “default” status of the resources involved in the commons (patented, 
copyrighted, open, or other)?
Attributes
Resources
• What resources are pooled and how are they created or obtained?
• What are the characteristics of the resources? Are they rival or nonrival, tangible or 
intangible? Is there shared infrastructure?
• What technologies and skills are needed to create, obtain, maintain, and use the 
resources?
Community Members
• Who are the community members and what are their roles?
• What are the degree and nature of openness with respect to each type of 
community member and the general public?
Goals and Objectives
• What are the goals and objectives of the commons and its members, including 
obstacles or dilemmas to be overcome?
• What are the history and narrative of the commons?
overview of the framework for reference. During the course of a case study, the proposed 
framework of questions described below and in the box is used in two ways. First, it is 
used as a guide in planning interviews with relevant actors. Second, it is used as a frame-
work for organizing and analyzing the information gained from interviews, review of 
relevant documents and related materials, and so forth. Though we describe the various 
“buckets” of questions in the framework sequentially, in practice the inquiry is likely to 
be iterative. Learning more about goals and objectives is likely to result in the identifica-
tion of additional shared resources, understanding the makeup of the community will 
lead to new questions about general governance, and so forth. Moreover, we anticipate 
that the framework itself will evolve and be honed through use. Indeed, the questions in 
the box and the discussion below already reflect some reorganization and fine-tuning of 
the framework as presented in our original work (Madison, Frischmann, & Strandburg 
2010a) in response to our experience with the case studies in this book, as discussed in 
more detail in the concluding chapter.
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1. The Background Environment: An Initial Conundrum
When seeking to apply the IAD approach to knowledge commons, we immediately con-
front a conceptual challenge. Ostrom’s inquiry begins by asking questions about the “bio-
physical characteristics” of the relevant resources. This inquiry takes as given a natural 
environment and natural resources that are to be shared and managed. In describing a 
knowledge commons, we must take a step back before describing the relevant character-
istics of the shared resources to ask how we should define the environmental or contex-
tual backdrop against which the knowledge commons operates. There is no clean way 
to separate a particular knowledge commons from its “natural” cultural background, 
because cultural activity is always grounded not only in the natural environment but 
also in human social interaction, the human-made material environment, laws, histories, 
practices, traditions, and social norms. Although there may not be one “natural” back-
ground environment for knowledge commons, it is nonetheless important, in investi-
gating a knowledge commons, to understand the cultural environment within which it 
is nested. The inquiry into the characteristics of its shared resources, community, and 
governance institutions must be framed in relation to that background environment. An 
Governance
• What are the relevant action arenas and how do they relate to the goals and 
objective of the commons and the relationships among various types of participants 
and with the general public?
• What are the governance mechanisms (e.g., membership rules, resource 
contribution or extraction standards and requirements, conflict resolution 
mechanisms, sanctions for rule violation)?
• Who are the decision makers and how are they selected?
• What are the institutions and technological infrastructures that structure and 
govern decision making?
• What informal norms govern the commons?
• How do nonmembers interact with the commons? What institutions govern those 
interactions?
• What legal structures (e.g., intellectual property, subsidies, contract, licensing, tax, 
antitrust) apply?
Patterns and Outcomes
• What benefits are delivered to members and to others (e.g., innovations and 
creative output, production, sharing, and dissemination to a broader audience, and 
social interactions that emerge from the commons)?
• What costs and risks are associated with the commons, including any negative 
externalities?
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appropriate description of the background environment will lead to a more concise and 
useful description of the knowledge commons under investigation and a better under-
standing of the sources and significance of the social, political, and economic aspects of 
knowledge commons.
We identify two canonical “default” background environments for knowledge com-
mons: a cultural environment without intellectual property rights, on the one hand, and 
an intellectual-property-based cultural environment on the other hand. In many cases, 
the background cultural environment for a particular knowledge commons will combine 
elements from these default regimes.
a. The Default “Natural” Cultural Environment
Despite the expansive scope of IP rights, a significant range of activities, practices, and 
intellectual resources remain outside the intended scope of IP regimes. This “natural” 
cultural environment includes cultural resources (including broad traditions, practices, 
disciplines, and concepts, as well as more specific artifacts and items of knowledge) that 
are excluded from IP regimes on subject matter grounds, material as to which IP protec-
tion has expired, and material that is excepted from IP coverage in certain circumstances 
(for example, via rules of fair use or fair dealing). Much of this natural cultural environ-
ment is in the public domain, and hence accessible and usable by anyone without the 
permission of anyone else, though the “natural” environment also includes the possibility 
for secrecy with respect to some resources.
When knowledge commons are constructed in arenas where IP rights do not apply, the 
most appropriate choice of background environment against which to describe them is a 
“natural” cultural environment unmediated by rights of exclusion or other regulation. The 
“natural” cultural environment also may be a useful baseline for investigating some knowl-
edge commons where intellectual property protection is available for the relevant resources, 
but plays a marginal role. For example, the Associated Press was constructed initially as a 
means of managing the sharing of an intellectual resource (news) that was not protected 
by the standard forms of IP law (the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution gener-
ally precludes copyright protection for facts). The AP was the plaintiff in the leading case 
that established an intellectual-property-like, but very limited, “hot news” doctrine barring 
a very specific type of misappropriation of factual information.8 Despite the existence of 
these limited IP-like rights, the AP knowledge commons is probably most concisely and 
clearly described in terms of its differences from the IP-free “natural” cultural environment.
For some resources, the “natural” cultural environment also includes the possibility of 
secrecy. A background culture of secrecy may provide the most useful default backdrop 
for describing some knowledge commons involving such resources. The norms of sharing 
access to magic tricks within the community of magicians, for example, arise in an envi-
ronment of strong background norms of secrecy (Loshin 2008).
8 See International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
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b. The Default Proprietary Environments
The two principal regimes of IP law—patent and copyright law—are the most salient 
alternatives to the “natural” environmental baseline described above. Patent rules 
vary somewhat from country to country, but generally time-limited patent rights are 
granted to the developers of an “invention” in some field of technology or human 
endeavor after an appropriate government agency examines a patent application (Nard, 
Madison, & McKenna 2013: 19–27). Patents are available for a wide range of subject 
matter, but certain types of subject matter, such as natural phenomena and abstract 
ideas, are not eligible for patent protection. A patent applicant must demonstrate to 
the satisfaction of the patent examiner that the invention claimed in the application is 
new (or “novel,” in the language of patent law) in that no one has invented it before; 
it is useful; it is nonobvious (in the language of American patent law) or possesses an 
“inventive step” (in most European systems), such that the invention represents a suf-
ficiently great technical advance over the existing art; and it is adequately described in 
the application for the benefit of future adopters and adapters of the technology. The 
holder of a valid patent possesses a statutory right to exclude all others from using, 
producing, or selling the invention, subject to extremely limited exceptions for experi-
mentation and research on the subject matter of the patent. Notably, however, patent 
rights expire after a relatively short term, typically twenty years. The invention covered 
by the patent then passes into the public domain. An example of a knowledge com-
mons for which a patented environment serves as an appropriate baseline is a patent 
pool.
Copyright law departs from the “natural environment” norm for the cultural environ-
ment in similar ways, and for similar reasons, but applies to artistic and creative cultural 
expression rather than to technological invention. Like patent laws, copyright statutes 
vary in their details from country to country yet generally embody a set of core prin-
ciples. The author of an “original” or creative work is granted a statutory entitlement to 
exclude others from reproducing, adapting, performing or disseminating that work to 
the public (Nard, Madison, & McKenna 2013: 435–39). By comparison to patent doc-
trine, copyright doctrine generally incorporates a relatively broad range of exceptions and 
exclusions. It generally excludes subject matter that is functional rather than expressive 
(and therefore the subject of patent law) or that is too broad or abstract to be identified 
clearly as the specific product of a specific author. Even when a work is covered by copy-
right, the author’s exclusive rights are generally subject to exceptions for uses that are 
deemed “fair use” in the United States or “fair dealing” in the United Kingdom, Canada, 
and some other countries, and to a range of other statutory exceptions, exclusions, and 
compulsory licenses. As with patents, expiration of the copyright delivers the covered 
material to the public domain. In general the term of copyright lasts far longer than the 
term of patent—the life of the author plus fifty years, in most countries, and the life of the 
author plus seventy years in the United States and European Union countries. Examples 
of knowledge commons for which copyright is an appropriate baseline are open source 
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computer software under the General Public License (GPL) and open access repositories 
for academic publishing.
2. The Basic Attributes of the Knowledge Commons
The next step after choosing an appropriate characterization of the “natural” environment 
in which a particular knowledge commons resides is to identify and describe its basic attri-
butes, which include its resources, participants, and goals and objectives. For each of these 
attributes, this section suggests a “basket” of questions to be asked during a case study. 
The resource characteristics and makeup of the community of a knowledge commons 
are generally co-determined with its goals and objectives and dependent upon its his-
torical narrative. These are critical subjects of inquiry. In addition to baskets of questions 
directly aimed at describing the resources and community, the inquiry into basic attri-
butes includes baskets of questions relating to goals and objectives, history, and narrative.
a. Resources
After choosing an appropriate baseline environment, the next step in investigating a 
knowledge commons is to identify the set of resources being pooled and the relevant 
community of actors. The resources being pooled in a given knowledge commons might 
appear to be obvious, such as patents in a patent pool, news items for a news service, 
or recordings for a database of music. But we caution against focusing too reflexively 
on the most obvious resources. For example, members of a patent pool might share 
other knowledge resources, such as pricing information, tacit knowledge about future 
research, or past failures. Often, it will take some consideration to identify the most 
salient description of the relevant resources. What resources are pooled and shared 
in an open source software community? Ideas? Computer code? Coding expertise? 
Debugging opportunities?
In many contexts, multiple types of resources might be shared within a knowledge 
commons. The dynamic character of intellectual and knowledge resources means that 
shared resources may not be fully independent of one another both in the sense that the 
value of one shared resource may depend on its relationship to other shared resources, 
and in the sense that any shared resource may arise from or be developed from a differ-
ent shared resource. The multiple contributions to a single open source software project 
demonstrate both features. The durability of shared resources also must be considered. 
Patents and copyrights expire; tangible objects, in which patented inventions and copy-
righted works of authorship often are embodied, may wear out or be consumed.
Our framework aims to be inclusive and aware of the variety of resources collected 
in knowledge commons. We avoid a focus solely on intellectual property assets or even 
on knowledge resources. Though its focus is on knowledge, a knowledge commons also 
may use, produce, and manage various rival resources. To understand the governance and 
effectiveness of a knowledge commons arrangement, it may be very important to study 
how these rival resources are managed.
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b. Community
Community members may be clearly and relatively simply identified—as they are in a 
patent pool—or the constitution of the community may be more complex. Does the 
open source software community consist of programmers alone? Does it include users 
of the code? People who submit comments or assist with debugging? Entrepreneurs who 
initiate meetings and dialogue or organize the community? People who develop, dis-
seminate, and manage the relevant licenses? Those who monitor compliance with license 
terms? People who develop tools, host websites, and otherwise support the community? 
A single answer is not necessarily appropriate; each of these constituencies and their spe-
cific roles should be described (Schweik & English 2012).
c. Goals and Objectives
The goals and objectives of a knowledge commons often are critical to defining the 
resources it creates and shares, its membership, and the action arenas in which its mem-
bers interact. Goals and objectives also are closely related to the social dilemmas that the 
commons must resolve. The goals and objectives of a natural resource commons often are 
evident from the common-pool resource itself and are defined by the problem of deplet-
ability or rivalrousness (e.g., removing lobsters from a fishery results in fewer lobsters for 
everyone else) and the risk that a common-pool resource will be exhausted by uncoor-
dinated self-interested activity (e.g., unmanaged harvesting may jeopardize the sustain-
ability of the lobster population).
Some knowledge commons have emerged and evolved over long periods of time and 
been influenced by large-scale historical, social, and/or economic forces that cannot 
be parceled neatly into an answer to the question, “what problem was being solved?” 
Contemporary research universities are, in one sense, examples of that phenomenon 
(Madison, Frischmann, & Strandburg 2009). Commons are not always built; sometimes 
they emerge. Indeed, as discussed below, we believe that an inquiry into the history and 
narrative of a knowledge commons is always important to understanding it. Nonetheless, 
we believe it is usually sensible to speak of knowledge commons governance regimes 
as having particular goals and objectives. Moreover, often, knowledge commons are 
purpose-built.
While the particular goals and objectives of a knowledge commons will usually be 
closely related to the specific resources and community involved, the goals and objec-
tives of a knowledge commons often will be tied to solving various problems and social 
dilemmas. Problems often addressed by knowledge commons include the production of 
intellectual goods to be shared, the overcoming of transaction costs leading to bargain-
ing breakdown among different actors interested in exploiting the shared intellectual 
resource, the production of commonly useful platforms for further creativity, and so 
forth (Merges 1996: 1295–1301, 2005: 1514–19).
Some knowledge commons deploy IP rights to solve collective action, coordination, 
or transactions cost problems that exist apart from IP rights and perhaps would not be 
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solvable without these rights (e.g., IP might be essential to facilitating collective action). 
Open source software projects, mediated by formal free and open source licenses and by 
informal communal structures for determining what code becomes part of the “autho-
rized” code base, are examples of this type. Standard-setting enterprises also fit into this 
category, as do joint ventures for scientific research and development. These knowledge 
commons depend on each member’s possessing certain intellectual property interests as 
a facilitator of participation.
Other knowledge commons are created, at least in part, to solve collective action, 
coordination, or transactions cost problems that exist only because of IP rights (Heller 
1998: 625). In some of these cases, commons governance offers a defense against potential 
privatization of commonly useful shared resources and the possibility that an individual 
IP rights owner would “hold up” the enterprise as a whole. Examples of such arrangements 
might include “open source” commons constructed for basic biological building blocks 
such as the Single Nucleotide Polymorphism (SNP) consortium (Morgan 2003) or the 
publicly available databases of genomic sequences that are part of the Human Genome 
Project (Kumar & Rai 2007). Formal licenses and related agreements assure that par-
ticipants become part of what amounts to a mutual nonaggression pact that is necessary 
precisely because of the possibility that intellectual resources may be propertized. So long 
as the resource is part of a commons institution, it can be shared among commons mem-
bers, and neither commons members nor outsiders are able to appropriate that resource, 
patent it, and then assert a patent claim against a commons member. Within commons, 
research proceeds more or less as it otherwise would, according to informal disciplinary 
norms and free of (or at least, less burdened by) undue anxiety about propertization and 
potential holdup.
A knowledge commons may also have the goal of mediating among communities with 
different default norms. Technology transfer institutions, which enable universities and 
other nonprofit research enterprises to deliver information resources (such as the tech-
nical knowledge described in patent specifications) to the private market, are examples 
of this type of commons ( Jones & Strandburg 2010: 13–17). The cultural environment 
inside the university is typically characterized by information sharing not governed by 
IP rights, even if IP rights are present as matters of form (Walsh et al. 2007: 1199–1200). 
Markets outside the university are governed largely by IP rights. Technology transfer 
institutions may constitute an institutional pool or commons that mediates these two 
regimes (Auerswald & Branscomb 2003:  79–80). Similarly, open source projects have 
developed “boundary organizations” to mediate their relations with commercial firms 
(O’Mahony & Bechky 2008).
Knowledge commons may also have less socially salutary goals. Most obvious is the 
case of members colluding to restrict competition (some believe that the Associated 
Press, for example, falls into this category (Baird 2005)). The inquiry into goals and 
objects should be sensitive to the possibility of such goals and objectives. But by requir-
ing as an initial matter that knowledge commons operate via sharing of intellectual 
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resources, we distinguish knowledge commons from cartels as such, which operate by 
sharing price and output information and which pose significant and obvious risks of 
anticompetitive behavior without offsetting welfare benefits (Viscusi et al. 2005: 116–
32). The functional purpose of cartels differs from the purpose of the knowledge arrange-
ments noted above; that is, cartels are not designed to create an open environment 
within which resources may be shared and productively used by members or to sustain 
individual members. The line between commons and cartels may be difficult to draw, 
however. Antitrust regulators have long faced the challenge of identifying illegitimate 
cartels disguised as legitimate patent pools and other knowledge-sharing institutions 
(Hovencamp 2012: §§ 30.4, 34.2).
These examples of the types of goals and objectives that may motivate the construction 
of knowledge commons arrangements are illustrative rather than exhaustive. Moreover, it 
may be the case—and may even likely be the case—that the motivations for any particu-
lar knowledge commons arise from a variety of considerations.
d. History and Narrative
All of the basic attributes of a knowledge commons—resources, community, and goals 
and objectives—often depend significantly on its narratives of creation and operation 
and on its history. Those narratives depend in turn on a variety of linguistic resources: the 
vocabulary and syntax that participants and observers use in describing the regime are 
keys to unlocking its origins, its operation, and even its future. The very phrase “patent 
pool,” for example, has come to signify a specific set of legal expectations and criticisms. If 
one says “patent pool,” an informed commentator thinks immediately of a self-governing 
arrangement and various antitrust considerations, rather than intellectual property prob-
lems and solutions, much less knowledge sharing.
Explicitly giving attention to history and narrative also encourages attention to 
evolutionary processes and avoidance of an overly static perspective. Looking at his-
tory can help answer the question of how the commons came to have its particular 
members, goals and objectives, and resources. History also reflects how a knowledge 
commons has changed and adapted over time and gives some basis for anticipating 
problems it may encounter in the future. Changes in a knowledge commons’ narra-
tive over time, or conflicts embedded within the narrative, can illustrate debates over 
purpose, which can illuminate the normative foundations of a commons and highlight 
points of conflict.
History and narrative also emphasize the importance of contextual details that are 
ignored or marginalized in an overly rationalist account of institutional design. They 
may provide information about individuals and their relationships to relevant institu-
tions. They also are likely to be useful in uncovering details concerning the influence of 
power, position, politics, and personalities in a particular knowledge commons that may 
be swept under the rug in a more taxonomic approach to describing the basic attributes 
of a knowledge commons.
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3. Governance and Rules-in-Use
The governance of a knowledge commons can, and should, be investigated from a several 
angles. First, the governance of a knowledge commons is often reflected in its approach 
to openness, with respect both to resources and community. Second, the governance of a 
knowledge commons often is reflected in general governance structures, some of which 
arise from the background environment and some of which are specific to the particular 
knowledge commons. Third, the governance of a knowledge commons is reflected in spe-
cific rules and norms that apply to particular action arenas. These different perspectives 
on governance overlap to some degree, and all are relevant to describing the “rules-in-use” 
that apply to particular action situations.
a. Degrees of Openness and the Character of Control
The nonrivalrousness of knowledge resources often means that the community has a wide 
range of choice about the degree to which use of the resources and participation in the 
community is open to all comers or confined to some. These choices about the degree of 
openness are matters of governance, but are influenced by and co-determine the commu-
nity’s goals and objectives, its membership, and the characteristics of its resources.
Commons regimes are defined both by the degree of openness and control that they 
exhibit with respect to contributors, users, and resources and by the assignment of con-
trol, or custody, of the power to administer access. The rules-in-use of knowledge com-
mons will reflect and delineate the degree of openness, particularly with respect to use of 
the resources by outsiders who do not contribute to resource creation. The inquiry into 
openness is often less relevant to natural resource commons arrangements, so we high-
light it here. Natural resource commons generally are finite, depletable in consumption, 
often congested (such that overuse reduces the value of the remaining resources), and 
subject to tragic overconsumption, even taking into account differences in the deplet-
ability and renewability of different natural resource pools (Frischmann 2008: 166–68). 
Consequently, it is often necessary to limit access to a common-pool resource to mem-
bers of a defined community, often geographically determined. The boundaries of the 
community sharing a resource tend to be coextensive with the boundaries of commons 
self-governance (Ostrom 1990:  61–88). In many cases, a natural resource commons is 
open to members and closed to everyone else, and that is the end of the story.
Knowledge and information resources, by contrast, are not subject to the same con-
straints and are naturally shareable without a risk of congestion or overconsumption. 
Rarely does “too much information” diminish the value of individual items of informa-
tion (Karjala 2006). It is entirely possible and desirable for a community to produce and/
or manage a cluster of cultural goods that is accessible to outsiders. Frischmann refers to 
this as “leveraging” the “nonrivalry” of intellectual resources (Frischmann 2009b: 810). 
One of the measures of the social benefit of knowledge commons may be the degree to 
which it disseminates its products to a wider audience.
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i. openness as applied to resources. What do we mean by openness? 
Little ambiguity exists in most everyday contexts (e.g., an open door), but openness 
can be a confusing term when used to describe a knowledge or information resource. 
Openness, as we use it here, describes the capacity to relate to a resource by accessing 
and using it. In other words, the openness of a resource corresponds to the extent to 
which there are barriers to possession or use. Openness varies according to the costs of 
surmounting barriers (in terms of money, conditions, or other restrictions) to exploi-
tation. Openness in this sense may encompass joint or shared access to and use of the 
resource (West 2007).
Barriers to possession or use of a resource may be natural or constructed. A resource 
may be open naturally because its characteristics prevent it from being possessed, owned, 
or controlled by anyone (consider, for example, the ocean). A resource also may be open 
as the result of social construction. That is, laws or rules may prohibit ownership or 
ensure a certain degree of openness. For example, copyright law grants protection over 
creative expression but excludes protection for ideas in order to maintain open access and 
the possibility of use. Patent law does likewise with respect to abstract ideas. Openness 
also may arise through social norms and customs among owners and users and through 
institutional design.
Openness and the vesting of control over openness are related. In part, both concepts 
may simply reflect choices regarding how best to manage resources. In the context of 
intellectual property pools, for example, management of the pooled resources may be 
vested in a central institution created specifically for that purpose, or it may be decentral-
ized and vested in the hands of individual IP rights holders. Openness and the sources 
of control also reflect power and its distribution among potential possessors and users. 
Openness may be measured by the degree of control that is exercised by one person or 
group over the terms of access and use of a specific resource by others. Openness relies on 
social institutions; it is a relational variable that describes the structure of relationships 
among potential resource users.
ii. openness as applied to a community. As a resource or set of resources 
may have an open character, so may a community. As with resources, the degree of open-
ness of a community is defined partly in functional terms, by natural and constructed 
attributes that define membership in the community, and partly in terms of power and 
other bases for relations among participants. (Accordingly, we focus much less on whether 
some social context is or is not a “community” according to predefined criteria and 
much more on the functional characteristics of that context.) As with openness applied 
to resources, openness with regard to a community describes an individual’s capacity to 
relate to that community as a contributor, manager, or user of resources that make up 
the knowledge commons. Openness describes the extent to which there are criteria for 
or barriers to membership or participation in the creation or innovation processes that a 
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knowledge commons is intended to support. Openness also describes the extent to which 
a particular community is accessible to and interconnected with related contexts, institu-
tions, and social practices.
The degree of openness of a knowledge commons with respect to community has 
an internal dimension as well as an external one, as it reflects the degree to which 
participants in the commons collaborate with one another or otherwise share human 
capital as well as (or rather than) resources. For example, the participants in an intel-
lectual property pool may specify rules regarding how resources are contributed to 
and withdrawn from the pool. The General Public License for open source computer 
programs specifies that membership in the community defined by users of the pro-
gram is open to anyone. Anyone may add to, use, or redistribute the licensed program. 
Redistributors, however, must abide by the license term that they make the full source 
code of the program accessible to further users of the program. Moreover, in most 
open source software projects, only certain contributions are accepted into “official” 
versions of the code (Kelty 2008: 27–31). Although use and modification of the code 
for personal use are open to anyone, the ability to contribute to the shared resource is 
regulated.
In describing and assessing the degrees of openness and control that characterize 
knowledge commons, one should bear in mind more than just the conventional pro-
ducer perspective by which information and knowledge shareability problems often are 
analyzed. Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” is typically understood as challenging mar-
kets and governments to offer ways to supply resources in the face of cooperation and 
competition problems (Ostrom 2008). In analyzing openness with respect to resources 
and communities, it is likewise tempting to limit the analysis to openness with respect to 
actual and potential resource producers.
The cumulative and aggregative character of knowledge is fundamental to human cul-
ture. Producers of knowledge and culture resources therefore are simultaneously users 
and consumers. It is important to consider whether and how the degree of openness of 
a knowledge commons accommodates the interests of users, as matters of both function 
and relation. In particular, a knowledge commons in the cultural environment may func-
tion as infrastructure, a platform, or collection of resources that serves as a foundation 
for further creation or innovation (Frischmann 2012). In the cultural environment, the 
tragedy of the commons that Hardin described may appear not as an undersupply of a 
resource prompted by overconsumption but instead as an undersupply prompted by the 
failure of the private market to aggregate user or consumer preferences for certain funda-
mental or “infrastructural” resources. This situation occurs, for example, in the context of 
basic research conducted within and across universities (Strandburg 2005: 97–99). The 
Internet itself constitutes a knowledge commons in a sense (as well as a collection of 
commons), and it is likely better characterized as an infrastructural resource that solves 
certain problems of consumption rather than as a resource that addresses problems of 
production.
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b. General Governance Structures
The general governance structures for a knowledge commons may include both exoge-
nous elements arising from the background cultural environment and formal or informal 
leadership or decision-making structures specific to the knowledge commons. Here we 
identify several relevant clusters of variables that will be important to explore to gain an 
understanding of the general governance structure of a knowledge commons:
• entitlement structures and resource provisions;
• institutional setting (including markets and related firm and collective struc-
tures, social structures that accommodate the roles and interests of individual 
actors in the commons, and boundary organizations or mechanisms mediating 
the knowledge commons’ interactions with external markets, the public domain, 
and other institutions);
• legal structures (including intellectual property rules, subsidies, contract and 
licensing law, antitrust provisions); and
• governance mechanisms of the commons (membership rules, resource contribu-
tion or extraction standards and requirements, conflict resolution mechanisms, 
sanctions for rule violation).
i. entitlement structures and resource provisions. This cluster 
of questions is intended to address the boundaries around the resources themselves and 
to analyze how those boundaries are socially constructed, by law, technology, tradition, 
custom, or practice. Complicating the initial set of questions concerning what resources 
are contributed and subject to the commons arrangement, this part of the inquiry aims 
to understand how the resources are delineated, contributed, and made part of the 
commons.
The “natural” information environment contains an abundance of raw information 
resources, including inherited and experienced knowledge. Those resources often are 
transformed into information “things” (such as works of authorship, patented inven-
tions, and commercial “trade secrets”) and therefore into resources in the common pool 
via some cultural construct, such as the default copyright or patent law systems, via 
some other institution, such as a publishing industry producing books, films, or songs, 
or via some combination of these and other institutions, such as cultural practices or 
norms—including, to be clear, the agency of individual actors. Understanding a knowl-
edge commons therefore requires understanding the mechanisms by which resources 
are provisioned to the commons, whether via legal entitlements or otherwise, and the 
nature of entitlements to use and consume those resources while they are part of that 
commons.
As with some natural resource pools that (when suitably managed) are self-sustaining 
and thus supply their own resources, in the cultural context commons resources may be 
inputs to the generation of additional resources. The follow-on invention is an obvious 
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example. An essential attribute of the governance of a knowledge commons, therefore, 
is the way in which it allocates resources as they are produced dynamically. In a patent 
pool, for example, the patents themselves are resources constructed via rights of exclu-
sion offered by patent law. As pool members develop follow-on inventions based on the 
pooled resources, the agreement by which the pool is constituted may obligate members 
to contribute patents covering those inventions to the pool. (Such grantbacks may raise 
antitrust concerns,9 which highlight the complexities of assessing the successes of com-
mons governance as a knowledge and information management strategy.)
Boundaries in an information environment are likewise more obviously culturally 
constructed than their counterparts in the field of natural resources. Oceans, lakes, and 
rivers have beds and shores; forests yield to fields. Boundary maintenance is an impor-
tant part of commons management in natural resources, but the maintenance question 
often has a reference point in naturally occurring boundaries. In the information envi-
ronment, all boundaries ultimately depend on social and cultural constructs, that is, on 
what law or society recognizes as boundaries of relevant things and resources (Madison 
2003). Accordingly, this cluster of questions is intended to help flesh out the connections 
between the construction of commons resources and their location—what we might call 
“nestedness”—in broader social and cultural systems.
ii. institutional setting. Knowledge commons are functional entities; 
they often serve participants in markets, industries, and firms. In such cases, it is impor-
tant to understand the identities and roles of those institutions and how their functions 
relate to the pool and its members. The Manufacturers Aircraft Association, an example 
of an early, well-known patent pool, was organized in large part to facilitate the produc-
tion of aircraft for military use during World War I.  A  full account of the MAA as a 
knowledge commons would need to explore not only the relationships among the mem-
bers of the MAA but also the relationship between the MAA and the United States 
government.
The institutional and social setting of a knowledge commons also may include related 
collectivist enterprises. Each member of a pool may be part of a network structure that 
extends to related collectives, firms, individuals, groups, and social structures, including 
professional disciplines and social norms (Strandburg et  al. 2006:  1301). For example, 
research scientists may be organized formally into pools or commons structures within 
formal institutions, such as universities, including schools, institutes, and departments. 
The shared discipline of a particular group of scientists will cross formal institutional 
boundaries and may be embedded in its own formal institutions. A scientist’s functional 
network may include members of his or her own technical art and related arts along with 
researchers in different arts who share a related but distinct set of social norms related 
9 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property 
§ 5.6 (1995), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf.
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to sharing of information and knowledge. Networks in not-for-profit or educational 
research settings also will overlap to a degree with related networks in commercial envi-
ronments. For example, researchers in university science departments will be interested in 
sharing information resources with researchers in corporate research-and-development 
groups (Strandburg 2009, 2010). A  knowledge commons may bridge gaps created by 
the edges of formal institutional structures. Moreover, knowledge commons also may be 
situated in nonhierarchical and distributed institutional settings, in which participants 
are only loosely connected and sometimes are connected only by their participation in a 
particular project (Benkler 2006: 59–90).
iii. legal structures that affect the commons. Although industry, 
market, and networked institutional structures are essential reference points for many 
knowledge commons, positive law and direct government involvement with a particular 
commons may likewise be keys to understanding it. We distinguish between law that 
creates and enforces the entitlements that sustain information works, on the one hand, 
and law that is specifically addressed to knowledge commons themselves, on the other 
hand. In some circumstances, law can reinforce and sustain knowledge commons that 
are determined by legislators or judges to be welfare-enhancing. For example, market 
conditions or technologies might be such that some kind of information collective 
would be useful, but fear of prosecution under antitrust law or relevant IP law may be a 
barrier to the emergence of the pool. In such a case, a safe harbor for knowledge sharing 
of a sort may emerge, either via legislation or judicial decision. An exemption or more 
deferential treatment from antitrust scrutiny for parties engaged in a form of concerted 
activity, or intended to engage in concerted activity, might be adopted (Hovencamp 
2012: § 36).
Legal rules may create subsidies or safe harbors for knowledge commons in ways 
other than by relieving at-risk parties from potential liability. For example, income-tax 
regimes may permit (or limit) the deduction of research expenses by firms, nonprofit 
enterprises, and/or research collectives. In the U.S.  patent statute, the section that 
bars patenting inventions that are “obvious” in light of prior art in the relevant tech-
nical field formerly excluded prior art from consideration if the patent applicant and 
the producer of the relevant prior art were part of a common “joint research agree-
ment.”10 Laws designed for one purpose also may effectively promote collaborations or 
collectives in ways not intended by their drafters. Such rules may become part of the 
constitution of a knowledge commons, even if they were not designed to do so. For 
example, Jessica Litman explains the persistence of a legal regime subsidizing jukeboxes 
in American copyright law along similar lines (Litman 2002:  351–53). A  compulsory 
10 35 U.S.C. § 103(c)(2) (2012). As part of the America Invents Act of 2012, applicable to patents that issue based 
on applications filed after March 16, 2013, that section was rewritten, and its provisions relocated to the section 
that requires that patentable inventions be novel. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(c)(2) (2012).
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license permitting owners of coin-operated record players to use copyrighted American 
music without authorization was initially incorporated into the copyright statute to 
prevent copyright holders from monopolizing adjacent markets for performances. Over 
time, the rationale for the subsidy became less significant, but the statute was retained 
because a new entity emerged to support its continued existence—companies that man-
ufactured and distributed jukeboxes. The compulsory license enabled a form of sharing 
of recorded music that was mandated by law rather than by consent of the individual 
rights owners.
iv. endogenous governance mechanisms. Understanding the governance 
mechanisms particular to a given knowledge commons is at the heart of the analysis. 
In Ostrom’s work, the degree of self-governance is an important characteristic of a 
resource pool (Ostrom 1990: 29–55). Membership in natural resource commons often 
entails rights not only to contribute to and extract from the pool but also to participate 
in governance processes for adopting and modifying the relevant rules of participation. 
Endogenous governance mechanisms may include formal or informal leadership roles, 
general approaches to decision making, conflict resolution procedures, technological 
platforms for communication and other general purposes, and so forth.
The inquiry into the governance mechanisms of a knowledge commons overlaps to 
some extent with the inquiry into its openness. The focus shifts, however, from access 
to shared resources to participation in decision making about how the resources will be 
produced and managed. Who decides who may be a member of the commons and what 
does membership entail? How are resource contribution and extraction monitored and, 
if necessary, limited? What sanctions and dispute resolution mechanisms are provided 
for dealing with conflict or misconduct? To what extent do the self-governance mech-
anisms of the commons rely on or incorporate formal legal mechanisms, and to what 
extent do they rely on or incorporate other, nonlegal institutions, technologies, or social 
structures?
For example, in the context of the General Public License for open source computer 
programs, commons membership is defined in part by the terms of the license and in part 
by use of the program, which, according to the terms of the license, constitutes assent to 
its terms.11 Violation of the terms of the open source license, for example by distributing 
a copy of a program without including a copy of the program’s source code, purports 
to terminate membership in the open source community automatically, by operation of 
law. Enforcement of the license regime typically is not pursued by individual contribu-
tors to the open source commons. Instead, the Free Software Foundation, a freestanding 
nonprofit entity dedicated to advocacy on behalf of “free” software and accompanying 
11 See Free Software Foundation, GNU General Public License, http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html, § 9.
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open source license terms undertakes responsibility for enforcement (Free Software 
Foundation 2013).
Effective enforcement of the rules-in-use of a commons depends on the availability of 
means to monitor members’ compliance with those rules. Before the emergence of the 
Internet, research on self-governing communities emphasized the size of the community 
and the distances between its members as key variables in the effectiveness of a moni-
toring system. Accordingly, conventional wisdom expected that informally governed 
groups would be relatively rare and believed that success would require modest size and 
relative homogeneity of interest. As Benkler (2006: 29–127) and Cohen (2006: 37–43) 
each argue, networking technology offers not only expanded potential for community 
development and resource aggregation but also the potential for increased monitoring 
and enforcement. (As the next section makes clear, that is not automatically a good thing, 
but it can help explain commons functioning.) Examination of a pool should include 
assessment of whether and how it is embedded in network technologies that perform or 
facilitate governance functions.
Research on natural resource commons also emphasizes that effective self-governance 
typically requires formal access to public sanctioning and/or enforcement mechanisms. 
Without the threat of seizure or attachment or injunction, community-based or purely 
norm-based mechanisms may lack sufficient bite to sustain the commons. In the context 
of knowledge commons, it is not yet clear when and whether it is important for com-
mons governance to be backed up by legal enforcement. Indeed, many social norms–
based governance regimes have been identified and studied (Raustiala & Sprigman 2012). 
In the open source computer software area, for example, courts only recently have begun 
to consider the enforceability of the licenses. For the most part, breaches are handled by 
informal norms.
c. Rules and Norms for Particular Action Arenas
A given knowledge commons may involve a number of different types of interactions 
among members or “action arenas.” Often, these action arenas will be closely related to 
the community’s goals and objectives. Over and above the exogenous and internal gen-
eral governance mechanisms of a knowledge commons, the rules-in-use of a particular 
action arena may be determined by rules or norms specific to that arena. It will probably 
be important to analyze how the basic attributes of a knowledge commons play out in a 
number of its action arenas to get a full understanding of how that commons functions.
4. Patterns and Outcomes Emanating from a Particular Action Arena
Finally, the analysis of a knowledge commons should include an inquiry into its patterns 
of interactions and outcomes. The outcomes of a knowledge commons typically will take 
two forms, which in a particular case often will be inextricably linked. With respect to 
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knowledge and information resources, a knowledge commons usually will produce some 
intellectual or knowledge-related (or material) output. Thus, the MAA enabled the pro-
duction of airplanes. The Linux open source project supports the Linux computer pro-
gram. Wikipedia produces Wikipedia.org. The AP enables the production of newspapers 
and other news resources.
In addition, the social patterns that emerge from the construction and governance of a 
knowledge commons may themselves constitute ongoing, constantly refreshed commons 
outcomes. Many of the companies that were parties to the original MAA agreement 
combined via merger and acquisition by 1929 to form the Curtiss-Wright Corporation, 
which is still a significant defense contractor today (Patillo 1998:80–81). The Linux proj-
ect and Wikipedia are notable not only for their production of complex industrial-scale 
products but also for their production of networks of contributors, distributed broadly 
in space and time, for whom participation in the commons is an important and meaning-
ful individual and social practice (Benkler 2006: 65–74). The AP and other wire services 
have cultivated and retained identities as distinct and productive enterprises despite the 
fact that much of what they publish is created by their members. The jamband commu-
nity is a recognized community that defines itself partly via its practices of archiving and 
sharing jamband performances.
The inquiry into outcomes should focus explicitly on any costs or harms associated 
with the commons as well as on its benefits. Knowledge commons should be assessed in 
light both of whether and how they serve their self-identified goals and objectives and of 
any collateral consequences. The patterns and outcomes bucket of questions should aim 
both to identify the outcomes of the commons under study and to describe relevant crite-
ria for evaluating those outcomes. Often, the evaluation of outcomes will begin with the 
identified goals and objectives of the community. The community may change its goals 
over time, and specific action areas may lead to the development of more fine-grained 
objectives that provide further basis for evaluation. Moreover, interactions with non-
members may provide additional outcomes to evaluate.
Since the eventual goal of this research is to extract generalizable knowledge that will 
be useful for policy makers, the evaluation of outcomes raises difficult and important 
issues about how to derive metrics that will permit comparative institutional analysis. 
The evaluation of success is explicitly normative; for example, one can ask about whether 
a community met its internal goals and objectives or about its overall impact on the wel-
fare of society. Comparing knowledge commons arrangements to one another requires 
comparable outcome metrics. For similarly situated communities with similar objectives, 
it may be relatively straightforward to develop appropriate metrics on a case-by-case 
basis. If one wants to compare differently situated communities with different objectives, 
the task is harder. Devising metrics that allow one to compare knowledge commons to 
other institutions for producing innovation and creativity may be even more difficult. 
The design of outcome metrics, which is a general challenge to comparative institutional 
analysis, is a subject for further research.
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a. Solutions and Benefits
We have noted that knowledge commons in the cultural environment emerge or are 
created for a variety of reasons:  as solutions to collective action or other transactions 
cost problems unrelated to legal intellectual property, as solutions to problems that arise 
from the nature of intellectual property entitlements, as solutions to boundary-spanning 
dilemmas, and as reactions to “infrastructure”-type problems stemming from the mar-
ket’s inability to aggregate individual demand for standards or platform resources—the 
inverse of the standard tragedy-of-the-commons diagnosis. The pool of potential knowl-
edge commons cases is, therefore, quite broad, and the range of possible solutions and 
benefits they produce is likewise broad.
For any specific knowledge commons, the inquiry into solutions and benefits should 
address not only the problems that the commons appears to be designed to solve and 
precisely how and whether it solves those problems but also whether the commons suc-
ceeds in generating and sustaining spillovers and contributing to a dynamic cultural 
environment more broadly. Quantifying or otherwise documenting the latter type of 
outcome may be particularly difficult, because the benefits of spillovers often accrue not 
only to direct consumers of the creative output of the commons, but to other members 
of society. As a result, assessments of success may, of necessity, take comparative rather 
than absolute form. Indeed, both the original IAD framework and our adaptation are 
intended for comparative institutional analysis. What kinds of comparisons might be 
relevant and useful as benchmarks in the knowledge commons setting? Researchers 
might ask about the respects in which commons governance helps to achieve outcomes 
(whether in terms of resources or community or both) different than (if not necessar-
ily better than, in all cases) the outcomes achieved by attempts to solve those problems 
using other institutional regimes, such as private rights allocated in markets, or govern-
ment regulation.
b. Costs and Risks Associated with a Cultural Commons
A knowledge commons approach often may involve a trade-off between the benefits 
anticipated from the commons, such as the dynamic welfare enhancements expected 
from open sharing, and the costs and risks associated with cooperation between those 
who might otherwise compete to provide knowledge resources in a market setting. In 
conventional law-and-economics terms, these costs and risks are fairly well understood. 
Importantly, they are in many instances better understood and easier to describe and 
quantify than the dynamic benefits that knowledge commons may supply. For example, 
institutions that enable firms to share access to pooled information resources may also 
facilitate cooperation along lines that may be anticompetitive and therefore socially 
harmful: agreements to raise and fix costs and agreements to reduce output. Knowledge 
commons also involve administrative costs associated with constructing, monitoring, 
and enforcing compliance with the rules of the pool. Here again the analysis is compara-
tive. Both costs and benefits associated with producing particular information resources 
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must be compared to the costs and benefits associated with producing the same kind 
of information resources by IP-based market transactions, government subsidy, or some 
alternative system.
V. Conclusion
Applying an environmental metaphor pioneered by earlier intellectual property law schol-
ars, we analogize information and knowledge resources in the cultural environment to 
physical resources in the natural environment. We identify a set of knowledge commons, 
or pools of information resources, that serve functions in the cultural environment similar 
to the functions provided by common-pool resources in the natural environment. These 
knowledge commons serve as alternatives to purely private rights of exclusion and to 
government intervention in solving a variety of underproduction and overconsumption 
problems associated with an unmanaged or “natural” resource. Although knowledge com-
mons exist for a variety of purposes, we hypothesize that they are often welfare-enhancing, 
because they solve the problems associated with producing nonrival information resources, 
while promoting knowledge distribution and valuable information spillovers.
We argue that understanding the origins and operation of knowledge commons 
requires case studies aimed at empirical assessment of a variety of attributes whose role 
and importance cannot be specified in advance based on simple models or our current 
understanding. Borrowing from Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development 
framework, we suggest a framework that should guide case studies of knowledge com-
mons in exploring the ways in which information resources and resource commons are 
structured by default rules of exclusion, and the ways in which members of these pools 
manage participation in the collection, production, preservation, and extraction of infor-
mation resources.
We offer the framework described in this chapter as a template for ongoing case study 
investigations of knowledge commons across a broad variety of domains. The case stud-
ies collected in this volume represent a small step in that direction. We hypothesize (and 
expect) that approaching the study of knowledge commons as an integrated field of 
research will elevate collective, intermediate solutions to a place of significance in accounts 
of property regimes and diminish skepticism about the range of situations that are ame-
nable to collectively governed, “open” approaches to knowledge production. Case studies 
will also call attention to the designed character of both the cultural and the legal envi-
ronments in which knowledge and information policy problems reside. Like Ostrom’s 
studies of natural resource commons, systematic analyses of knowledge commons across 
a wide range of collected case studies are likely to lead us to doubt panacea prescriptions 
drawn from overly simplistic models. Understanding how knowledge commons work 
should enable better design of knowledge-producing and knowledge-distributing insti-
tutions generally.
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The existing scholarly literature reports various case study investigations of creative insti-
tutions grounded in social norms (Schultz 2006), transactions cost economics (Merges 
1996), and even history and anthropology (Kelty 2008), all of which may be profitably 
aggregated and recast as examples of knowledge commons. One step in that direction is 
our application of the framework to analyze universities as cultural commons (Madison, 
Frischmann, & Strandburg 2009). Collecting and reconstructing this literature using the 
clusters of questions listed above will, in our estimation, yield new insights into the emer-
gence and effective functioning of knowledge commons. Going forward, and beginning 
with the cases included in this volume, we anticipate developing an inventory of new com-
mons case studies. We also hope other scholars will consider using this framework as part 
of their own work. Over time, we hope that the results of further case studies will yield not 
only better descriptive information regarding knowledge commons but also refinements 
to the knowledge commons framework and to the above clusters of questions. In a real 
sense, the study of commons is itself a knowledge commons, and our own three-part col-
laboration is a nested commons within the scholarly community that studies commons.
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